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Preface & Acknowledgements 
Welcome to our Tenth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! We regret that this 
year it will be a “paper only” event. The double whammy of sequestration and a continuing 
resolution, with the attendant restrictions on travel and conferences, created too much 
uncertainty to properly stage the event. We will miss the dialogue with our acquisition 
colleagues and the opportunity for all our researchers to present their work. However, we 
intend to simulate the symposium as best we can, and these Proceedings present an 
opportunity for the papers to be published just as if they had been delivered. In any case, we 
will have a rich store of papers to draw from for next year’s event scheduled for May 14–15, 
2014! 
Despite these temporary setbacks, our Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) continues at a normal pace. Since the ARP’s 
founding in 2003, over 1,200 original research reports have been added to the acquisition 
body of knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has 
engaged researchers at over 70 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the 
diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.  
We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from 
academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, 
sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to 
seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we 
serve as a “broker” to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS 
graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of 
scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. 
We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past 
and encourage your future participation. 
Unfortunately, what will be missing this year is the active participation and 
networking that has been the hallmark of previous symposia. By purposely limiting 
attendance to 350 people, we encourage just that. This forum remains unique in its effort to 
bring scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in 
application and rigorous in method. It provides the opportunity to interact with many top DoD 
acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both in the formal 
panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, breaks, and the 
day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to establish new teaming 
arrangements for future research work. Despite the fact that we will not be gathered 
together to reap the above-listed benefits, the ARP will endeavor to stimulate this dialogue 
through various means throughout the year as we interact with our researchers and DoD 
officials.  
Affordability remains a major focus in the DoD acquisition world and will no doubt get 
even more attention as the sequestration outcomes unfold. It is a central tenet of the DoD’s 
Better Buying Power initiatives, which continue to evolve as the DoD finds which of them 
work and which do not. This suggests that research with a focus on affordability will be of 
great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to come. Whether you’re a practitioner or 
scholar, we invite you to participate in that research. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:  
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 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & 
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 Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, 
Department of Energy 
 Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development, Test, & 
Evaluation 
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Abstract 
Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition requires information technology (IT) to undergo the 
DoD information assurance certification and accreditation process (DIACAP), which makes 
strong architecture-dependent assumptions. Emerging IT architectures, such as mobile 
computing platforms, invalidate these assumptions and prevent the DoD from acquiring 
commercial technologies that are readily available to adversaries. To address this problem, 
we introduce a preliminary framework in which an application profile is expressed in a formal 
language and scaled with evolving architectural assumptions. This profile aims to incorporate 
information assurance (IA) requirements that are commensurate with risk and scalable based 
on an application’s changing external dependencies. Information assurance risk levels that 
account for changing user identities and IA parameters (confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability) will result from dynamic recombination of mobile applications during runtime. The 
language is expressed in first-order logic and includes an evolvable lexicon to describe 
changing system configurations. We envision that software developers and certification 
authorities can use these formal profiles with an inference engine to complete the DIACAP 
and maintain compliance as IT systems evolve over time. The framework has been evaluated 
using existing DoD acquisition and DIACAP policy and a case study in a popular mobile 
application ecosystem. 
Introduction 
Network-centric (net-centric) warfare (NCW) is the “generation of increased combat 
power by networking sensors, decision makers and shooters” (Alberts, Garstka, & Stein, 
1999). The Department of Defense (DoD) adopted NCW as a principle concept of 
operations as early as the late 1990s. This adoption includes increased efforts to move 
information from garrisoned to command posted and out to “the edge,” or front-line 
combatants, to reduce the time from decision to action and create a more mobile, agile, and 
reactive force. During this transition, General Cartwright noted that NCW must decouple the 
chain-of-information from the chain-of-command (Onley, 2006; Carter, 2010) to enable the 
right people to gain access to the right information at the right time. Unlike enterprise 
information systems in garrisons and command posts, computing at the edge must be highly 
dynamic and responsive to fast-changing situations. This fast-paced environment yields 
rapidly changing software requirements, evolvable software architectures, and utility 
computing, which stress the current DoD acquisition system. The DoD acquisition challenge 
is that edge computing requires mobile applications, which are increasingly software-
intensive, developed on shorter timelines, and subject to different cyber security risks 
(Defense Science Board, 2009).  
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The short IT development timelines have led commercially available IT to outpace 
the DoD’s ability to rapidly acquire IT solutions. This is concerning when adversaries can 
acquire and deploy this technology worldwide and with few restrictions. Mobile computing 
platforms, such as Apple iOS and Google Android, offer a stark contrast to traditional 
computing paradigms because they enable the rapid development and deployment of 
commercial software to handheld devices, including tablets and smartphones. This software 
integrates data from multiple sources and significantly reduces the time from decision to 
action: New “apps” include software to complete banking transactions by digitally 
photographing bank checks, to purchasing music based on audio fingerprinting, to 
integrating mapping, routing, and directory services to locate nearby retailers, all within 
seconds. In these examples, apps leverage built-in devices, such as cameras, microphones, 
or geo-location technologies, to create narrowly integrated solutions. However, recent efforts 
to enable rapid DoD acquisition has focused on non-software-intensive systems (Carter, 
2010; Wyatt, 2010). 
Mobile computing introduces new IT security risks within a single IT system and 
collectively across multiple, networked systems. Unlike traditional non–software-intensive 
systems, IT security vulnerabilities can compromise other systems on a shared network. To 
reduce cyber security risk, the DoD Chief Information Office (CIO) maintains DoD Directive 
(DoDD) 8500.1 “Information Assurance” and DoD Instruction 8500.2 “Information Assurance 
Implementation,” which outline policy, responsibilities, and procedures to integrate IT 
security protections into DoD information systems. Most DoD weapon systems subject to 
DoDD 5000.1 in the DoD Acquisition System must comply with these CIO policies. These 
policies are primarily written for enterprise systems, which excludes mobile computing as 
envisioned at the edge in NCW. The challenges of modernizing the IT acquisition policy 
have been attributed to a culture of buying large weapon systems, such as aircraft carriers, 
as opposed to incremental purchases of components that integrate into pervasive, complex 
systems (Boessenkool, 2009). Moreover, recent calls for modernizing acquisition have 
called for 80% solutions, which is a departure from complete, service-centric solutions that 
become outdated before they’re completed (Gates, 2009). Mobile applications are 
exemplars of these modern acquisition challenges. 
The U.S. Army has been a leader in the adoption of mobile applications in the DoD. 
In March 2010, the U.S. Army began the “Apps for the Army” challenge, which sought to test 
a rapid acquisition process for software applications on mobile devices. The challenge 
received 53 mobile applications, of which the Army successfully fielded 25 applications 
through the certification process (Lopez, 2010). In addition, the Army is actively engaged in 
training mobile application developers in its Mobile Applications Branch at Fort Gordon 
(Walker, 2011). Finally, the Army is taking steps to increase its mobile device infrastructure: 
After testing 20–30 smartphones in theater, the Army is now seeking to field 3,500 
smartphones for a single brigade (Brewin, 2011). The Relevant ISR to the Edge (RITE) 
program recently completed testing and seeks to develop technologies to link critical data to 
soldiers in the field using smartphones, thus further pushing this paradigm forward 
(Montalbano, 2011). These steps further illustrate the need for adequate solutions to certify 
mobile applications.  
In this paper, we propose a preliminary framework to model app IT-dependencies 
with the following long-term aims: (1) to reduce IA certification and accreditation time by 
semi-automatically matching IA assumptions to application profiles; and (2) to extend 
existing IA policy assumptions to cover emerging mobile applications required in edge 
computing. This paper is organized as follows. We first review DoD IT acquisition and IA 
policy environment and present policy gaps that inhibit acquisition of mobile applications; 
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next, we briefly present our framework, application profile, and language to address this 
problem; finally, we discuss our evaluation and plans for future work before concluding with 
related work and our discussion. 
DoD Information Technology Policy 
The DoD information technology (IT) policy environment is complex and distributed 
across multiple documents. The leading Department of Defense (DoD) policies for IT 
acquisition and information assurance (IA) are summarized in Figure 1. The general DoD 
acquisition policy and responsibilities are detailed in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5000.1, and the 
DoD-wide IA policy begins in DoDD 8500.1, which is refined by IA controls contained in DoD 
Instruction 8500.2 and by the process for performing IA certification and accreditation, 
described in DoDD 8510.1.  
 
 General Overview of the DoD IT Acquisition Environment for 
Information Assurance 
DoDD 8500.1 governs information systems that include mobile computing devices, 
such as laptops, handhelds, and personal digital assistants (see DoDD 8500.1, § 2.1.2.7) 
and, in particular, those devices that contain wired or wireless network access to other 
computing resources. This instruction covers four classes of information system, as follows: 
 Automated Information System (AIS) Applications, which are products of an 
acquisition program, such as software applications, or a combination of 
software and hardware, such as workstations, servers, and mobile 
computers; 
 Enclaves, which are a collection of computing environments connected by 
internal networks, under the control of a single authority and security policy; 
 Outsourced IT-based Processes, which are business processes supported by 
private sector information systems; and 
 Platform IT Interconnections, which are network access points to computer 
resources that are essential to the mission in real-time. 
Figure 2 illustrates an example IS environment, consisting of two enclaves, “A” and 
“B,” which correspond to a garrison and command post, respectively. These environments 
contain AIS applications (square boxes) and outsourced IT-based processes (circles), some 
of which are DoD controlled and appear within the enclave, and others that have shared 
control and appear outside the enclave. Platform IT Interconnections appear as solid black 
arrows: When these connections exit an enclave, a demilitarized zone (DMZ) is assumed to 
exist between the outgoing and incoming network traffic. Mobile computers, such as laptops 
and handhelds, are a class of AIS application that are capable of moving across enclave 
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boundaries; in Figure 2, the dotted-line arrows indicate movement of a handheld computer 
from the battlefield, into a command post, and later into a garrison. To enable this 
movement, IA controls must be in place to avoid contaminating these DoD controlled 
environments. For example, DoD 8500.1 defines the Mission Assurance Category (MAC) as 
the level of integrity and availability required by an information system. Enclaves always 
assume the highest MAC of their computer resources (AIS applications, outsourced IT-
based processes, and platform IT interconnections). When an enclave connects to another 
enclave that has a lower MAC level, the enclave with the higher MAC level must ensure that 
this connection does not degrade the integrity and availability of its computer resources. 
This presents a particular challenge for mobile devices because they could move across 
enclaves. 
 
 Example Information System Environment to Illustrate System 
Interactions 
Applications for mobile computers, specifically handheld computers, have an 
operational profile that is situated among several policy gaps in existing IA policy. Under 
DoDD 8500.1, Designated Approving Authorities (DAAs) are responsible for certifying and 
accrediting these devices. Policy gaps create challenging certification environments in which 
the DAA must assume insurmountable risk for an unprecedented DoD information system. 
The combination of changing users, changing applications, and changing locations is 
characteristic of these devices. Consequently, a solution is needed whereby configurations 
can be reviewed dynamically in the field based on explicit IA assumptions that are 
individually bound to the mobile device hardware and collections of installed mobile 
applications. Figure 3 illustrates a subset of this complex policy environment: Boxes 
represent existing DoD IA-related policy; ovals represent IA controls from DoDI 8500.2; and 
arrows trace policy guidance from DoD8500.2 to IA controls and on to other applicable DoD 
policies. Using our requirements specification language (Breaux & Gordon, 2013), we 
extracted a core set of 95 requirements governing DoD IA responsibilities. We now discuss 
how these policies and IA controls apply to mobile applications, noting relevant shortfalls 
due to unique characteristics of this technology. 
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 Example DoD Information Assurance Policy Gaps Affecting Mobile 
Applications 
Mobile Code 
Mobile code is defined by DoDD 8500.1 to be “software modules obtained from 
remote systems, transferred across a network, and then downloaded and executed on local 
systems without explicit installation or execution by the recipient.” DoDI 8500.2 requires IA 
control DCMC-1, which requires implementing mobile code policy in DoDI 8552.1. This 
mobile code policy consists of approval decisions pursuant to one of three mobile code 
categories, which are differentiated by (a) whether the mobile code is digitally signed by a 
trusted certificate; and (b) the level of access to operating system resources and networks 
that is granted to the mobile code. Mobile computing is enriched by mobile applications 
(code) that can be downloaded and installed remotely to address emerging issues. 
However, the italicized phrase above in the mobile code definition excludes this policy from 
covering mobile applications, despite that many of the technical considerations (e.g., the 
mobile code category differentiators (a) and (b)) are relevant to mobile applications. 
Mobility 
DoDD 8500.1 defines mobile computing devices to include laptops, handhelds, and 
personal digital assistants operating in either wired or wireless mode. DoDI 8500.2 states 
that authorized users may “not relocate or change DoD information system equipment or the 
network connectivity of equipment without proper IA authorization” (§ 5.12.12), requiring 
advance IA authorization to move mobile computing devices. To employ compliant mobile 
computing devices, there is a need to rapidly reauthorize these devices as they move within 
and across enclaves, recognizing that these devices also contain mobile applications, which 
may change over time and thus change the device’s risk profile. 
Application Servers 
The Defense Information System Agency (DISA; 2006) defines application server as 
a single computer that, in conjunction with other servers on a network, provides an 
application service to a user through a web browser. Application servers, such as Apache 
Tomcat and BEA Weblogic Server, are “containers” that provide application infrastructure 
while server administrators can remotely deploy applications that are pre-packaged as web 
application archives (WARs). DoDI 8500.2 contains IA control DCCS-2, which requires 
compliance with available security technical implementation guides, or STIGs. Only recently 
were new STIGs developed to cover mobile device operating systems (iOS, Android, or 
Blackberry OS). Previously, the DISA’s STIG governing application servers, which requires 
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activity (DISA, 2006), were the closest approximation of how mobile apps are installed on 
mobile devices, the main difference being that the STIG assumes that application servers 
are fixed in an enterprise information system. 
Wireless Networking 
Wireless computing and networking capability is not required, but it significantly 
amplifies mobile computing capabilities. DoDI 8500.2 contains IA control ECWN-1, which 
requires that workstations, mobile computing devices, and other portable electronic devices 
comply with DoD wireless policy. This policy includes DoDI 8100.2, § 4.3, that states that 
wireless devices may not be operated in classified environments without approval by the 
DAA in consultation with CSA CTTA; and § 4.10, which requires a knowledge management 
process to determine acceptable uses of wireless devices and appropriate mitigation 
strategies. 
Virus Protection 
DoDI 8500.2 contains IA controls ECVP-1, which require virus protection for servers, 
workstations, and mobile computing devices, such as laptops. For general-purpose 
computers, virus protection includes anti-virus software that recognizes file signatures that 
correspond to malicious code; this code is downloaded from a remote computer. Mobile 
devices running restricted operating systems, such as Apple’s iOS or Google’s Android, 
however, constrain the environment in which remote code can be executed. In these 
devices, mobile application infrastructure, including pre-approved applications in a trusted 
app store, can reduce or eliminate exposure to malicious code for some mobile applications. 
Our analysis of the Android 2.2 STIG, Version 1, Release 1, yielded 59 requirements 
that affect mobile Android devices. Among these, 40 requirements target the operating 
system, 16 requirements target apps, and three requirements target external actions, such 
as ensuring that mobile users respect the physical security policy when using the 
smartphone camera. Requirements WIR-MOS-AND-006-01 and WIR-MOS-AND-006-3 
require approval from the DAA or application control board for all non-core apps. This 
includes an inspection of the app and risk analysis. Although some tools exist to conduct 
static analysis on source code to identify common vulnerabilities (e.g., buffer overflows), to 
our knowledge no tools exist to analyze mobile app requirements for the purpose of 
identifying security risks. As a result, the current guidance is inadequate to support the DAA 
in evaluating non-core apps. Therefore, we now discuss our framework that aims to begin to 
address this problem. 
Mobile Application Framework 
Mobile devices that run pre-approved mobile applications can be viewed as 
miniature enclaves, in which the user has the authority to reconfigure and recompose new 
functions from multiple AIS applications (mobile apps) and initiate connections to pre-
approved outsourced IT processes using platform IT interconnections. Unlike general-
purpose computing enclaves, these applications, processes, and interconnections operate 
on pre-defined data types in a restricted computing environment. Some mobile applications 
leverage general-purpose data types, such as e-mail clients or web browsers, but most use 
restricted data types, such as dates, locations, images, audio, and so forth. Advances in 
miniaturization may lead to mobile devices that run multiple computing environments in 
parallel, in which each environment processes different information classes with approved 
guards for moving unclassified data into classified environments within the same mobile 
device. For example, recent work has demonstrated the ability to run multiple mobile OSes 
on the same device using virtualization (Suh et al., 2008). Finally, we envision that mobile 
devices can be moved between enclaves, which changes the runtime assumptions under 
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which mobile applications are permitted to operate. Mobile applications approved to handle 
unclassified data cannot operate in classified physical and cyber environments without 
approved guards to prevent the unauthorized release of classified data. Similarly, classified 
applications cannot operate in unclassified environments. 
Figure 4 illustrates several challenges to accrediting mobile applications. In Step 1, 
Figure 4, application (app) developers create an application profile in the EADL for their app 
based on the mobile application system architecture. In the future, this profile may be 
generated using code-level analysis to assist in certification (e.g., do network connections 
use OS SSL libraries, or does file I/O encrypt data in storage?). In Step 2, the DAA certifies 
the app using the application profile and may accredit the app for deployment to the mobile 
device under this profile. The certification and accreditation includes a digital signature of 
the application profile, which the mobile device will use to execute the application only in 
enclaves that conform to this profile. In Step 3, the signed app is loaded into a DoD app 
store, authorized users can download the app to their mobile device.   
 
 Example Life Cycle for a Mobile Application in a Handheld Device 
In our framework, mobile applications are assigned to different categories based on 
their resource utilization profile. We envision the following categories: CAT 1, 2 or 3, which 
describe the level of remote connectivity, may be combined with CAT A and B, which 
describe the type of local interactivity. These categories were validated based on our 
analysis of DoD IA policy. 
 CAT 1: Stand-alone apps are installed with their complete data set, such as 
training manuals, calculators, or dictionaries. These apps do not make 
connections to remote servers or the Internet. 
 CAT 2: Restricted apps periodically make connections to pre-approved 
servers only. These apps include weather services and route-finding 
applications that receive updated maps from pre-approved sources. 
 CAT 3: Unrestricted apps may make connections to remote servers that are 
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 CAT A: Apps may use specialized operating system resources, such as 
cameras, microphones, speakers, GPS coordinates, and so forth. 
 CAT B: Apps may exchange pre-defined data types with other apps. 
We examined descriptions of mobile applications in the context of current initiatives 
in the United States Army. Among the five winners of the Apps for Army Challenge, three 
Apps could be developed as CAT 1 apps (New Recruit, Physical Readiness Trainer, and 
Telehealth Mood Tracker): The first two apps provide access to stable knowledge bases that 
can be updated periodically in new, self-contained versions of the application; these may 
include hard-coded web pages, training videos, and so forth that reside locally on the mobile 
device. The remaining two winners, Movement Projection and Disaster Relief Operations, 
appear to be CAT 2A apps: They rely on map-routing data that can be acquired from an 
approved source, such as Google Earth and Google Maps. If these connections are not 
secured, they could leak information to intermediaries who route the data to the map server, 
which is a CAT 3A app. We envision that these categories can be further subdivided; for 
example, CAT A can be subdivided to distinguish the use of a mobile camera, versus the 
use of location-based services and accelerometers. We further envision static analysis tools 
that can be developed to analyze the source code of these apps to automatically determine 
which category the app falls within. 
Mobile Application Profile and Language Overview 
The mobile application profile is described by a set of requirements to express data 
flows for a single mobile application. These requirements are formalized in the description 
logic (DL) using the semantic parameterization method (Breaux, Antón, & Doyle, 2008). 
Based on our mobile application framework, an certification authority may want to prove 
that, for a given configuration (collection of mobile applications), no CAT 3A apps are 
operating during field operations that could disclose a soldier’s location to an untrusted, 
third-party server, or that no communications exist between CAT 2B and CAT3B apps that 
may disclose sensitive data to third parties. 
To achieve this aim, we begin by formalizing a subset of data requirements using 
three Deontic modalities: Obligations describe what the app is required to do; prohibitions 
describe what the app is prohibited from doing; and permissions describe what the app is 
permitted to do. Formal requirements analysis is used to identify conflicts between what is 
permitted and what is prohibited, noting that obligations imply permissions in Deontic Logic 
(Horty, 1993). In addition, we define a series of roles based on Fillmore’s (1968) case 
frames and Gruber’s (1976) thematic roles to encode the actors engaged with the data, the 
type of data, and the purpose for which the data is used. At present, the restricted set of 
requirements covers only three specific actions: Collection, which is any act to access, 
assign, collect, import, observe, or receive information from another party, sensor, or device; 
transfer, which is any act to disclose, provide, share, or transfer data to another party; and 
use, which is any action performed on the data by the app for a particular purpose, 
excluding collections and transfers. The set of data requirements expressed formally 
constitutes the data flow aspect of the mobile application profile. App developers can 
formalize these statements using their knowledge of the app’s operations, or by using stated 
natural language requirements, scenarios, or privacy and security policies written specifically 
for the app. We now illustrate this formalization using an example natural language 
statement from a written policy. 
Figure 5 portrays a statement that has been encoded using the formalism; a more 
complete description of the formalization and an empirical case study is described in Breaux 
and Rao’s (2013) study. In Step 1, the analyst identifies important keywords that indicate the 
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action (e.g., import, enter), the modality, and the role fillers: the object (e.g., address book 
contacts) is the data type, and the purpose (e.g., locating contacts) for which the data will be 
used. Because the verbs import and enter denote the movement of data from the user to the 
app, these verbs indicate a collection. In Step 2, the keywords are written into a simple SQL-
like syntax that encodes a permission, indicated by the language operator P, followed by the 
action name and the role fillers. The first role filler is the object, followed by the language 
keyword FOR that precedes the purpose for which the action COLLECT is performed. Using 
DL, we can express complex hierarchies of data types, actor roles, and purposes. These 
hierarchies allow us to check whether permissions that broadly allow information sharing of 
coarsely described information types conflict with prohibitions restricting the sharing of 
specific types. Conflicts of this type frequently arise due to exceptions in security policies. 
Finally, in Step 3, an automated tool parses the language syntax and compiles a DL 
expression in the Web Ontology Language (OWL). The compiled expression is denoted in 
Figure 5 by the two axioms for concept p8: The first axiom defines the concept p8 as a 
collection action with the appropriate role fillers; the second axiom defines the concept p8 to 
be a subclass of what is permitted. Using a theorem prover, we can check these profiles for 
internal consistency (i.e., are there any conflicts among the encoded data requirements?). 
We can also check these mobile application profiles for consistency with external properties 
by expressing these properties in the formal language, such as prohibiting transfers to third 
parties of certain data types (e.g., e-mail addresses). Using DL, we reduced data 
requirements conflict detection to DL satisfiability, which is known to be PSPACE-complete 
for this family of DL. 
 
 Example Encoding of Data Requirement Into Formal Language 
Case Study and Simulation 
At present, the language has been developed and validated using information 
privacy policies that describe privacy and security requirements, such as what information 
may be collected, used, and transferred, for what purposes, and by whom. These activities 
architecturally describe an app’s data flows and, based on the providers and recipients of 
the data described in these policies, these activities frame the app in a larger information 
ecosystem that consists of the cellular network provider, the mobile phone and operating 
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system manufacturers and third-party service providers upon whom the app depends. Each 
of these ecosystem members maintain separate privacy policies that describe what is 
permitted and prohibited with respect to personal data. In addition, privacy has been viewed 
as a “subset of security” because these same information-sharing policies also affect 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system: Companies often aim to increase 
information availability and integrity to improve their services, while users wish to increase 
confidentiality of personal information. Best security practices, such as complex passwords, 
data encrypted in storage and in transfer, and so on, have also been described in these 
policies. Finally, these policies are increasingly required by regulators and mobile app 
stores, such as Google Play and iTunes, which makes these policies a pervasive, publicly 
available, and rich source of security requirements upon which to develop a preliminary 
data-flow language for assessing our mobile security risk framework. 
Our case study to evaluate the language’s formal semantics focused on the analysis 
of three policies that are linked in an integrated service scenario (Breaux & Rao, 2013). The 
scenario consists of the Facebook social networking platform, the Zynga game service, and 
AOL advertising network: Each of these parties has separate policies that govern the user’s 
interaction with Zynga online games, such as Farmville. Analyzing these three policies 
yielded 374 statements, of which 144 statements were data security requirements that were 
expressed in the formal language. Among these, the analysis produced two critical conflicts 
that we detected with our automated theorem prover: One conflict was between the Zynga 
policy and the Facebook policy because Zynga reserves the right to share information 
obtained from Facebook in violation of Facebook’s application developer’s policy. 
Finally, we built tools to parse and reason about these policies. Our simulation 
studies, which are based on these tools, show that identifying conflicts can be performed 
within a reasonable amount of time (a few minutes) for profiles containing on the order of 
100 rules. The simulation evaluated conflict detection using three different DL theorem 
provers: the Pellet OWL2  Reasoner v2.3.0 developed by Clark and Parsia, the HermIT 
Reasoner v1.3.4 developed by the Knowledge Representation and Reasoning Group at the 
University of Oxford, and the Fact++ Reasoner v1.5.2 developed by Dmitry Tsarkov and Ian 
Horrocks. Conflict detection for HermIT and FaCT++ was shown to be linear and constant, 
respectively, with respect to the number of rules. The Pellet reasoner was unable to scale 
beyond four rules in our simulation due to a design decision in this version of Pellet 
regarding how they handle a certain class of DL expressions. In future work, we aim to 
optimize conflict detection for larger policies, as needed. 
Future Work 
In future work, we plan to investigate three extensions to the mobile app framework 
and language. First, we aim to enhance our technical approach by developing framework 
extensions to link security specifications among multiple, separate apps. These extensions 
would allow an analyst to trace data flows across multiple apps and thus check whether 
security properties are held across these apps and their third-party services. We already 
have preliminary evidence to demonstrate this extension. Second, we aim to extend our 
framework to investigate how security policies change as mobile devices move across 
enclaves. This requires establishing and comparing physical security policies for physical 
locations with policies for apps that interact with those locations, either through user data 
entry, location-based services, cameras, or other means. As we discussed with Figure 2, we 
aim to support graceful degradation to limit the services that become disabled to only those 
that are not trusted in high security enclaves. Finally, we aim to extend our formal language 
with additional security properties to describe how data is properly stored, what attributes 
must be true during collections and transfers, and so forth. 
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In this paper, we described an overview of the approach and summarized our 
evaluation based on policy analysis and a runtime simulation. In the future, we seek to study 
the use of our framework in an experimental setting to answer questions, such as the 
following: How well can app developers write security specifications for their apps using our 
framework, and how well can certification authorities use these specifications to assure the 
app conforms to security best practices? We imagine that new interfaces to our formal 
methods would be needed and that static and dynamic analysis tools could help authorities 
verify that app runtimes conform to the stated app security profile. 
Related Work 
Related work includes enterprise architecture languages, which are used to express 
relationships between IT resources at a system-wide level, other work to analyze information 
assurance policy in privacy and security, and work to model information assurance 
properties in systems. Enterprise architecture (EA) is an informal concept consisting of four 
layers: business, information, applications, and technology. The layers provide notional 
constructs for capturing the range of personnel roles, responsibilities, assets, and functional 
system requirements. The Open Architecture Framework (TOGAF; The Open Group, 2009), 
Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DODAF; DoD CIO, 2010), and Zachman’s 
Framework (Zachman, 2008) provide business analysts with guidelines and worksheets to 
capture architectural elements, but none of these frameworks use formal languages to 
enable model checking to find inconsistencies and conflicts within an architecture. 
Alternatively, Breaux and Powers (2009) found the Business Process Modeling Notation 
(BPMN), a declarative language for describing business processes, to be ineffective to 
express necessary temporal constraints in policy requirements. Ouyang, van der Aalst, Ter 
Hoftede, and Mendling (2009) asserted that the Business Process Execution Language 
(BPEL), preferred as the candidate formal semantics for BPMN, only works for limited 
classes of BPMN models (Ouyang et al., 2009). 
Extensive work has been done to model information assurance policies. Breaux 
developed an early framework to extract privacy and security requirements from regulations 
(Breaux, Vail, & Antón, 2006), which was later validated in the context of healthcare (Breaux 
& Antón, 2008). This work led to the development of a requirements-specification language 
to further automate the encoding process (Breaux & Gordon, 2013). More recently, this work 
has been formalized using DL to model-check requirements (Breaux et al., 2008) and to 
trace requirements across mobile application policies (Breaux & Rao, 2013). Breaux has 
studied the gap between security policy and functional requirements and found a need to 
express both elements of physical and cyber security architecture in the same language to 
reason about modern vulnerabilities in distributed systems (Breaux & Baumer, 2011). 
Discussion and Summary 
In this paper, we presented a mobile application framework that can be used to map 
existing DoD IA policy onto emerging mobile devices. The aim of the framework is to identify 
opportunities for new methods and tools to decrease the time required to assure that mobile 
devices and their applications conform to IA policies. Our approach consists of a taxonomy 
for classifying mobile apps based on different security risks and an application profile and 
language for describing data flows within mobile apps that can be used to check for security 
conflicts. The profile describes what information is collected, used, and transferred, and for 
what purposes; and the language is used to express the profile formally and to identify 
conflicts within and between profiles using automated theorem proving. In future work, we 
plan to extend the framework with extensions to address potential policy conflicts across 
physical locations as mobile devices traverse different enclaves. In addition, we aim to 
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experimentally evaluate this approach with mobile app developers and certification 
authorities responsible for verifying that these apps conform to relevant policy. 
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